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ABSTRACT: This paper explores dynamics of formalization and informalization as interlinked
social processes as a contribution to a critical understanding of rule of law capacity building
programs in the framework of  EU enlargement policy. It also challenges the assumption
according to which informality would be a modality characteristic of countries of the “Global
South”.
The  concept  of  “informal  economy”  was  forged  in  the  framework  of
development studies (Hart 1973). While it  has been – and is often still  –
uncritically employed to refer to a distinct, separate “sector” from the formal
economy, it is widely recognized today that informal practices permeate the
formal  economy  (Guha-Khasnobis,  Kanbur,  Ostrom  2007).  A  significant
contribution to a critical assessment of informality as a process linked to
formal practices came from the anthropological scrutiny of the legal/illegal
divide (e.g. Heyman 2013), a pervasive dichotomization recently complicated
by “extralegality”, a broader conceptual framework referring to diverse kind
of social processes in which collective and individual agents and institutions
interact,  favour  and/or  contrast  the  production  of  both,  formality  and
informality in given social contexts (Smart, Zerilli 2014).
Drawing  on  ideas  and  ethnographic  material  developed  while  doing
fieldwork  within  EU-funded  legal  cooperation  projects  –  formerly  in
Romania, and more recently in Kosovo – in this commentary we focus on dia-
lectics  and  tensions  between  formalization  and  informalization  as  inter-
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linked  social processes. We notably explore how dynamics of in/formalization
may serve to penetrate logics and mechanisms of programs and projects of
justice development, and particularly the diffusion of a certain legal culture
under the “rule of law” umbrella concept.
While a number of authors have began to unpack the concept of rule of
law itself, seeing it as a historical, cultural artefact of and for governmental,
domination,  and  other  exploitative  practices  captured  by  the  idea  of
“plunder”  (Mattei,  Nader  2008),  we  suggest  to  look  at  rule  of  law  as  a
commodity exchanged across the global legal marketplace. A market where
legal  knowledge,  expertise  and  consultancy  are  exported  and  imported,
offered, and in fact traded from countries of the “Global North” – aka the
donors, each in competition with each other  –  towards countries  of  the
“Global  South”  – the  beneficiaries  of  international  aid,  struggling  for
recognition – in the form of projects and programs of legal development. The
challenge we take, hence, is to bring current reflections on in/formality as
social process back to (legal) development studies, notably in the framework
of rule of law capacity building programs.
Prishtina,  capital  and  largest  city  of  Kosovo,  Europe’s  youngest  state.
Especially the summer from early in the morning till late evening a plethora
of bars and cafes around the city centre are plenty of people having their
macchiato, a very tasty coffee. Stereotypes about Kosovar Albanians insist on
their laziness. Their ability “to work” in cafes is often object of jokes and self-
ironies. Actually, the tremendous number of  meetings held in cafes  is  an
important aspect of the projects’ social life and indeed  an opportunity to
develop the projects in which “locals” and “internationals” cooperate. From
apparently  innocent, ironic  comments  the  tone  of  the  conversation  may
suddenly  shift  to  serious  observations.  While  discussing  about  the
organization  of  a  seminar  for  a  project,  a  young  official  of  the  Kosovo
Ministry of justice says: «Do they [the internationals] really think they can
just come here in their imperialistic way? They don’t respect my country. They
don’t know anything about us – and they want to tell us, how to make our
country better? No, you cannot bring rule of law like this!» (emphasis added).
Since the end of the Cold War the world-hegemonic legal regime known as
the  rule  of  law  has  increasingly  driven  privatization,  marketization  and
democratization programs, notably across the region interested by the EU
enlargement policy. According to the EU, «the rule of law is the backbone of
any modern constitutional democracy. It is one of the founding principles
stemming  from  the  common  constitutional  traditions  of  all  the  Member
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States of the EU and, as such, one of the main values upon which the Union
is based.  Respect for the rule of  law is  a precondition for EU membership»
(emphasis added)1. But how such precondition is achieved in actual practice,
if  ever?  And  how  respect  for  the  rule  of  law  as  a  precondition  for  EU
membership intersects with the “respect for my country” from the vantage
point of people belonging to beneficiary administrations?
Among  several  other  instruments,  the  EU  adopted  the  Twinning,  an
institutional building tool designed to develop cooperation between public
administrations  of  EU  member  states  and  of  beneficiary  (candidate  or
potentially candidate) countries2.  A considerable part of the EU budget for
enlargement  is  allocated  for  developing  rule  of  law  capacity  building
programs across the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance region (IPA)3.
Drafting a Twinning call for proposal and the application itself are rigidly
formalized  procedures.  The  competition  among  applicant  countries,
however,  is  often  influenced  by  extralegal  practices,  notably  the  unique
political and economic relationships certain member states have established
with IPA region countries. For a member state, “to win” a project means to
get financial resources and the opportunity to exercise a considerable power
influence on the ground, notably on the way the legal system of a beneficiary
country could be shaped, with significant economic consequences including
financial investments, joint ventures and commercial partnerships.
The backbone of Twinning are usually two project leaders – one on behalf
of  the EU member state  leading the project, the  other  of  the  beneficiary
administration – a “Resident Twinning Adviser” (RTA) from a EU member
state and his local counterpart. The RTA is usually assisted by two salaried
“locals”: an assistant and a translator. The general aim of a Twinning is to
provide support for the transposition, implementation and enforcement of
the  EU legislation  (the  EU acquis). Hundred  pages  of  EU-law have  to  be
translated  in  another  language  and  transposed  into  a  national  legal
framework,  finding  the  best  solution  in  structure  and  wording.  In  this
process  of  legal  harmonization  «law  is  not  mathematics»,  as  one  RTA
observes.  In  order  to  transpose  and  translate  a  legal  provision  different
1. See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council. A new
EU  Framework  to  strengthen  the  Rule  of  Law,  available  at  http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52014DC0158R(01) (accessed on 12/11/2017).
2.  See  htps://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/tenders/twinning_en  (accessed  on
12/11/2017).
3. The IPA region includes Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, the  former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia, Kosovo, Montenegro, Serbia and Turkey.
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solutions are possible: «You cannot imagine the fights behind the façade!
Even  within  the  EU,  member  state  countries  are  fighting  for  their own
solution!», the same informant suggests. Interestingly, while disagreements
and controversies are relevant for understanding the actual implementation
of  projects  and  their  final  outcome,  the  conflictual  dimension  does  not
appear in official documents. Divergent opinions regarding how to face an
accident  or  to  address  a  technical  issue  are  average  during  unofficial
meetings, email  exchanges, and cell  phone conversations. Those informal
negotiations, however, perceived as ubiquitous and «quite exhausting!», in
the words of one expert, are carefully removed from the project reports. «It is
a long way to negotiate a report. A considerable amount of time is spent
writing reports in order to find the correct wording», the same expert adds.
Not infrequently, the project leaders in charge of the report are asked by EU
representatives to rewrite this or that section in order to make it consistent
with  the  original  blueprint,  its  structure  and  wording  such  as  “terms  of
reference”, “assumptions”, “local ownership”, and so on. Similarly, under the
current EU audit regime, a work plan has to be implemented, benchmarks
have  to  be  fulfilled,  reports  to  be  written,  documents  to  be  produced,
visibility guarantee, sustainability assured. As Riles (1998) has observed for
similar cases of negotiations of international agreements, matters of  “form”
(i.e. aesthetics) appear more important than questions of “meaning”.
Frequently  glossed  as  “internationals”,  experts  working  for  Twinning
programs  are  experienced  legal  practitioners  from  EU  member  states.
Typically they are legal professionals, judges, prosecutors or academics with
a permanent position in their home country public administration. In our
experience they are often male close to retirement age, who feel flattered by
the  opportunity  to  provide  their  job  with  an  international  dimension:
«working as an expert here [in Kosovo] is a chance to give an international
turn  to  my  career»,  said  one  expert.  In  addition  to  several  benefits,
internationals often show themselves enthusiastic and proud to turn their
knowledge and longstanding legal experience at the service of “developing
democracies”.  Beyond  such  moral  implications,  many  of  them  consider
working  as  a  consultant  in  a  country  like  Kosovo  an adventurous, exotic
experience: «Isn’t our life more interesting and exciting here?», an expert
observes and immediately responds: «Oh, how boring it will be, when back in
my  country  office!».  Obviously,  money  is  another  important  factor:  the
payment due for a mission abroad is usually very convenient comparing to
the salary the same expert would earn in the home country.
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International  experts cooperate with  “locals”, namely officials  and civil
servants of beneficiary public administrations, usually  professionals with a
university background in law. While at least  in principle experts from EU
member  states  and  officials  from  candidate  countries  share  the  same
commitment  (as  prescribed  by  the  Twinning  manual  itself),  their  actual
collaboration  is  challenged  by  their  structurally  unequal  position  in  the
project  in  terms  of  roles,  access  to  the  project’s  budget  and  capacity  to
influence the project’s implementation. In fact, the Twinning does not allow
recruitment of local officials in the role of paid experts. Logics and rhetoric
of  cooperation  and  learning  by  doing  on  which  the  Twinning  is  based
reserves to the locals (and only to some of them) the opportunity to take part
to  seminars  and  “study  visits”,  the  latter  being  educational  initiatives
organized by representatives of the EU member state in their home country
and institutions. These are often also occasions for tourism and leisure, and
are perceived by  locals  as a  source of  revenue in addition to the modest
salary  of  the  beneficiary  public  administration.  As  anticipated,  major
discrepancies  between  locals  and  internationals  concern  their  different
retribution and what they actually “get” from participating in a project. If we
look at the average budget of a Twinning project (typically from € 1.2 to 2.0
million) from an accounting perspective, roughly 80% of the total amount of
the expenses goes for the RTA salary, the short- and long-term experts’ fees.
In other words, as one RTA observes, «the money goes back to EU member
state representatives, instead of reaching the beneficiary country», as one
might expect.
Interestingly,  although  these  structural  inequalities  affect  the  actual
collaboration and the everyday project’s social life, there seems to be a non-
spoken mutual agreement between “locals” and “internationals”. Beyond the
effectiveness  of  the projects  and irrespective of  their  actual  outcomes all
actors involved share the idea that new projects have to be launched and
ongoing  missions  extended.  This  is  cynically  summarised  by  a  local
informant  as  the  common  interest  «to  keep  the  sick  person sick». A full
recovery  of  the  patient  would  not  justify  any  further  aid  intervention  of
assistance reducing a number of opportunities (including salaries for local
staff, benefits for the local economy and infrastructure like hotels, taxis and
restaurants etc.) for many of the actors actively involved in making the rule
of law a commodity to be exchanged and traded across the legal marketplace,
at both local and global level.
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To conclude, ethnography among “internationals” and  “locals” actively
involved in the legal marketplace also shows that assigning to countries of
the  “Global  North” the  role  of  providers  of  legal  rationality  and  formal
procedures for countries in the “Global South”, the latter being presumably
“affected”  by  informal,  traditional,  and  often  corrupt  practices  is  a
misleading  ideological  assumption, albeit  persistent  in  both  popular  and
academic discourse. An insider view of the legal marketplace rather suggests
that  formal  and  informal  practices  and  processes,  their  intricacies  and
uneven  configurations  permeate  the  actual  implementation  of  the
cooperation projects, beyond the local/international divide.
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